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Abstract 
The  success  of  an  agent  mediated  e-market  system  lies  in  the 
underlying reputation management system to improve the quality 
of services in an information asymmetric e-market. Reputation 
provides  an  operatable  metric  for  establishing  trustworthiness 
between mutually unknown online entities. Reputation systems 
encourage honest behaviour and discourage malicious behaviour 
of  participating  agents  in  the  e-market.  A  dynamic  reputation 
model  would  provide  virtually  instantaneous  knowledge  about 
the changing e-market environment and would utilise Internets’ 
capacity for continuous interactivity for reputation computation. 
This  paper  proposes  a  dynamic  reputation  framework  using 
reinforcement  learning  and  fuzzy  set  theory  that  ensures 
judicious use of information sharing for inter-agent cooperation. 
This  framework  is  sensitive  to  the  changing  parameters  of  e-
market like the value of transaction and the varying experience of 
agents with the purpose of improving inbuilt defense mechanism 
of the reputation system against various attacks so that e-market 
reaches  an equilibrium state and dishonest agents are weeded out 
of the market. 
Keywords:  Reputation,  Reinforcement  Learning,  Fuzzy 
attribute weights, e-market. 
1. Introduction 
With the growing popularity of e-commerce and amount of 
information on WEB, users expect automated techniques 
to assure the trustworthiness of information available on 
internet.  Software  agents  offer  a  promise  to  change  e-
commerce trading by helping internet traders to purchase 
products from online distributed resources based on their 
interests and preferences [16]. Assuring the trustworthiness 
of  web  products  and  services  in  such  an  environment 
where  actual  traders  may  never  meet  each  other  is  a 
challenging  task  performed  by  reputation  systems. 
Reputation  systems  have  a  high  utility  in  those 
environments where entities are long lived, feedback about 
the  current  interactions  is  captured  and  distributed,  and 
past  feedback/experience  guides  buyer  decisions  [22]. 
These systems are oriented to develop trustworthiness or 
the degree to which one agent has confidence in another 
within the context of a given purpose or decision. 
The  definition  and  meaning  of  reputation  varies  with 
applications  and  contexts.   F rom  an  objective  view, 
reputation  is  expressed  as  “a  quantity  derived  from  the 
underlying social network which is globally visible to all 
members  of  the  network”  [25]  or, “a perception that an 
agent  has  of  another’s  intentions  and  norms”  [17]. 
Reputation  and  Trust  are  often  used  in  complementary 
fashion  as  an  agent  expects  positive  outcomes  when 
interacting  with  another  agent  that  has  a  reputation  for 
being trustworthy [8]. Some systems are described as trust 
systems as therein agents determine whether another agent 
will  do  what  it  says  it  will,  whereas  others  are  best 
described  as  reputation  systems  because  therein  agents 
compute and propagate their beliefs about other agents. 
The e-market environment in which these agents operate is 
generally  open,  that  means  agents  can  join  or  leave  the 
marketplace at any time; uncertain, i.e. the true worth of a 
good can be judged only after its purchase; and un-trusted, 
that  is  the  e-market  comprises  of  honest  and  dishonest 
agents.  The  e-market  is  populated  with  self  interested 
buyer  and  seller  agents  that  try  to  maximise  their 
respective  gains.  The  e-market  environment  is  itself 
dynamic in nature as it undergoes continuous changes with 
different agents joining and leaving the e-market at will. 
The power of a reputation system in an agent mediated e-
commerce  can  be  realized  to  the  optimum  if  different 
process models inherent to the e-transactions like deciding 
about  pricing  of  goods,  computing  and  distributing 
reputation  of  participants  and  selection  of  a  seller  for 
purchasing a good are also dynamic [29]. A truly dynamic 
model  must  be  sensitive  to  the  changing  e-market 
environment  and  must  adapt  to  changing  experience  of 
buyer/seller  agents  with  each  transaction.  Dynamic  e-
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knowledge about the changing e-market environment and 
would  utilise  Internets’  capacity  for  continuous 
interactivity.  Designing  efficient  and  robust  reputation 
systems that satisfy both the buyers as well as sellers is a 
challenge for the research community. 
The objective of this paper is to propose a framework for a 
dynamic reputation system that is sensitive to the changing 
parameters of the dynamic e-market environment like the 
experience of agents involved in transactions, value of a 
transaction and number of transactions between the same 
buyer-seller  pair.  In  the  proposed  model,  each  of  the 
individual  process  model  of  the  dynamic  reputation 
framework  is  itself  dynamic  as  selection  of  a s eller  for 
buying  a  good  depends  on  the  changing  experience 
between a buyer-seller pair; computing sellers’ reputation 
by a buyer depend on the experience of an agent in the e-
market, mutual experience of a buyer-seller pair and the 
value  of  transaction.  Further,  incorporating  value  of 
transaction in reputation computation affects the amount of 
reputation  that  is  to  be  enhanced  or  reduced  after  each 
transaction. This makes the reward/penalty proportional to 
the  size  of  the  transaction  in  which  honest/dishonest 
behavior  is  exhibited  by  seller  agents,  and  negates  any 
benefit of a Value Imbalance attack where a seller agent 
gains  reputation  by  showing  honesty  for  small  value 
transactions and then cheats for a large value transaction. 
Making  the  reputation  updation  dependent  on  the 
experience  of  agents,  by  varying  the  weightage  of 
individual  experience  and  shared  opinion  from  others, 
reduces the effect of Ballot Stuffing attack where a number 
of  malicious  agents  artificially  enhance  or  reduce  the 
reputation of another agent. Also, by making the reputation 
updation  sensitive  to  the  fact  that  whether  reputation  is 
earned from a single buyer or multiple buyers minimizes 
the  effect  of  collusion  between  a  buyer-seller  pair.  The 
proposed framework employs judicious use of information 
sharing  and  thus  reduces  the  associated  cost  by  using 
effective inter-agent communication. 
The reputation computation strategy proposed in this paper 
uses reinforcement learning (RL) techniques which provide 
a  general  framework  for  sequential  decision  making 
problems [10]. RL deals with what an agent should do in 
every  state  that  it  can  be  and  how  to  map  situations  to 
action,  in  order  to  maximize  the  long  term  reward. The 
learner  must  discover  which  actions  yield  the  maximum 
reward by trying them. Sometimes, actions may affect not 
only  the  immediate  reward,  but  also  all  subsequent 
rewards. Hence, trial-and-error search and delayed reward 
are the two most important distinguishing features of RL. 
In the proposed strategy, for purchasing a good, the buyer 
chooses a seller offering the highest expected value of the 
good i.e. good with highest expected utility for the buyer. 
Expected  buyers’  requirement  from  a  good  constitutes 
buyers’  estimation  of  goods’  attributes  and  is  subjective 
and fuzzy in nature. It is subjective as relative priority of 
attributes of a good would vary with each good and with 
each buyer.  It is fuzzy as generally buyers’ expectations of  
a particular attribute are specified in fuzzy terms like “low” 
or  “high”.  Similarly,  a  buyer  has  to  map  linguistic 
assessment  of  goods  being  offered  by  different  sellers 
based  on  their  attributes  to  the  fuzzy  scale.  Hence  this 
paper  uses  fuzzy  set  theory  to  allow  a b uyer  agent  to 
compute attribute weights of a good and to select a seller 
that offers the good with highest expected value. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Various 
reputation models from literature and in commercial use 
are  introduced  in  section  2.  Section  3  presents  the 
proposed  dynamic  reputation  framework.  To  address 
existing problems, section 4 illustrates the performance of 
the proposed system against known attacks. A case study is 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
Reputation  models  are  an  important  component  of  e-
market, help building trust and elicit cooperation among 
loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic 
agents [12]. A number of reputation models described in 
literature are discussed below. 
The  evidential  model  [2,  3]  for  reputation  computation 
assumes a distributed reputation environment and is based 
on  Dampster  Shafer  Theory.  An  agent  finds  the 
trustworthiness  of  another  agent  [3]  based  on  its  direct 
interaction and testimonies of  other trustworthy agents. 
Some reputation models [21, 26] from literature employ 
reinforcement  learning  and  are  based  on  individual 
experience  only. In reputation model for  increasing  user 
satisfaction [26], seller agents adjust the price and quality 
of goods to maximise their profit. A multi-facet reputation 
model [21] involves reputation computation of both buyer 
and seller agents using quality, price and delivery time of 
goods. But, these systems [21, 26] suffer heavily from re-
entry  and  multi-identity  attacks  as  these  use  negative 
reputation  and  new  sellers  do  not  start  from  minimum 
reputation. 
TRAVOS [15] employs Bayesian probability analysis and 
computes  trust  of  an  agent  by  taking  into  account  past 
experience between two agents, and in case of lack of past 
experience,  this  model  utilizes  the  information  collected 
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uses an endogenous approach to filter out unfair opinions. 
PeerTrust [19] is a reputation model that uses techniques 
for resilient reputation management against vulnerabilities 
like feedback sparsity and feedback manipulation. It talks 
about  dynamism  in  electronic  communities  from  the 
perspective of  honest and dishonest behaviour of actors. 
Reputation  in  Gregarious  societies  (REGRET)  [16,  17] 
employs  fuzzy  rules  to  find  reliability  of  witness  agents 
based on their relationship with the target agent. REGRET 
is  a  multi-facet  reputation  mechanism  that  models  the 
reliability  of  reputation  based  on  the  number  of 
interactions of witness agents with the target agent. 
Another model  “Trunits” [24] is based on accumulation of 
trust units (trunits). A seller must possess sufficient number 
of trunits before executing a transaction. To engage in a 
transaction, seller  must risk a particular quantity of trunits 
which is put into an escrow with the market operator. After 
a transaction, if buyer is satisfied, seller gets more trunits, 
otherwise it loses risked ones. 
Broker  assisting  TRS  [4]  is  a flexible  model   b ased  on 
Artificial  Neural  Networks  (ANN)  that  employs 
backpropagation algorithm. Use of ANN helps to reduce 
noise data and supports incremental training, so each agent 
requests for information only from those having a similar 
reputation evaluation criterion. 
In  Reputation  Dynamics  and  Convergence  [8],  authors 
formalize  the  desiderata  that  from  a  dynamic  systems’ 
perspective a reputation system should have the properties 
of  Monotonicity  and  Accuracy.  As  an  example  of 
Monotonicity, agents  who provide high quality goods at 
low price should acquire better reputation and,  in systems 
with focus on Accuracy,  the buyer should quickly learn 
the accurate reputation value for the seller. The Dynamic 
Framework  proposed  in  this  paper  incorporates 
Monotonicity  as  the  process  of  seller  selection  and  also 
updation  of  reputation  are  based  on  the  presence  of 
favourable goods’ attribute like low price and high quality. 
Further,  a  fraudulent  seller  is  penalised  immediately  to 
keep the reputation estimate accurate.   
The P4P (Pervasive Platform for Privacy Preferences) [20] 
system  concentrates  on  privacy  control  in  case  of  e-
transactions. The paper acknowledges the property of e-
market environment being dynamic and, the need that the 
existing  systems  in  this  environment  should  also  be 
dynamic.  It  emphasizes  importance  of  reputation  by 
allowing the clients, the freedom to not disclose personal 
data according to the level of reputation. 
A  number  of  simple  online  reputation  systems  are  in 
commercial use. eBay [14] is the most popular auction site 
that has feedback forum as a reputation system in which  
after each transaction, a  buyer rates a seller as positive, 
negative  or  neutral  i.e.  +1,  -1  or  0  respectively.  The 
reputation  of  a  user  is  computed  by  subtracting  total 
number  of  negative  feedbacks  from  the  total  number  of 
positive  feedbacks  obtained  from  distinct  users  [23].  
Amazon  [13]  is  America’s  largest  online  retailer  where 
reviews include star ratings from 1 to 5 and a prose text. 
Average of all ratings is used to assign reputation.  
A limitation of the existing systems from literature [1, 3, 4, 
8,  15,  16,  19,  20,  21]  is  that,  during  the  process  of  
computing or updating of reputation values, these do not 
take  into  consideration  the  changing  parameters  of 
dynamic e-market environment like the varying experience 
of agents and the value of a transaction which make them 
vulnerable  to  different  attacks.  The  proposed  reputation 
framework  incorporates  value  of  a t ransaction  in  the 
strategy of reputation computation to remove the problem 
of  Value  Imbalance  attack  and,  varies  the  weightage  of 
individual  and  shared  reputation  components  with 
changing  experience  of  agents  to  minimise  the  effect  of 
Ballot Stuffing attack. 
3. Dynamic Reputation System Framework 
Reputation systems are oriented to encourage trustworthy 
behaviour,  increase  user  satisfaction  and  deter  dishonest 
participants by providing means through which reputation 
could be computed and disseminated [22]. The e-market 
environment  in  which  reputation  systems  operate  is 
dynamic  as  it  changes  continuously  in  terms  of  agents 
freely entering/exiting the market and also with the varying 
experience  of  agents.  Therefore,  as  a b uyer  gains 
experience  of  a  sellers’  behaviour  with  each  repeated 
transaction, the weightage of the individual experience of a 
buyer-seller  pair  should  increase  as  compared  to  the 
opinion shared by other buyer agents. Moreover, economic 
worth of being honest or dishonest in a transaction cannot 
be  judged  without  taking  into  account  the  value  of  a 
transaction  as  honest  behaviour  in  a l arge  transaction  is 
more important than in a small transaction.  
A  dynamic  reputation  framework  should  base  the 
reputation  computation  methodology  itself  on  the 
dynamics  of  the  e-market  environment  to  infuse  some 
inbuilt defense capability against possible attacks. In order 
to  have  a  robust  and  high  utility  reputation  system, 
different  activities  belonging  to  reputation  computation 
methodology  it  should  be  adaptive  to  the  changing 
environment  and  the  experience  of  agents  involved  in  a 
transaction.  The  next  section  describes  the  proposed 
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reinforcement learning and fuzzy set theory. 
3.1 Buyers’ Strategy for Reputation Computation  
The  proposed  buyers’  strategy  is  based  on  the  e-market 
model having a set of buyers and sellers. In this model, 
sellers are divided into four categories, namely, reputed, 
non-reputed, dis-reputed and new sellers. The reputation of 
seller s being computed by buyer b is composed of two 
components: individual reputation and shared reputation. 
These two components are combined to represent overall 
reputation of a seller agent.  
In this model, B represents the set of buyers, S represents 
the set of sellers and, G the set of goods. Let   [0,1) 
represents  individual  reputation  (IR) 
component,   [0,1) represents shared reputation 
(SR) i.e. the opinion of other buyers for seller s, and   
[0,1) represents overall reputation of seller s at time t, for 
the  buyer  b.  At  time  t+1,  buyer  b  stores/remembers  the 
overall reputation   of all sellers  , with whom 
buyer  b has interacted at time t in the past. Each buyer 
maintains four categories of sellers as defined below. 
(i)      :    Sellers  in  the  reputed  list  of  buyer  b, 
i.e.  ,  where    ,    is  the 
reputation threshold of buyer b and    . 
 
(ii)   :  Sellers in the non-reputed list of buyer b, i.e. 
 where   . 
 
(iii)    :    Sellers  in  the  dis-reputed  list  of  buyer  b, 
i.e.   , where   ,   is the dis-
reputation threshold and  . 
 
(iv)   : Sellers that are new to buyer b in the market, 
initially   A  new  seller  s  remains  in  this 
list  until  its  reputation  crosses  the  dis-reputation 
threshold  .  Before  crossing  ,  if  a s eller  cheats 
than it is moved to the list of dis-reputed sellers   
and is never considered again for business. 
The  process  of  choosing  a  seller  for  purchasing  a good 
based on its expected value uses three important algebraic 
operations on fuzzy numbers: inverse, addition and multi-
plication.  If   and     
are two positive trapezoidal fuzzy numbers then, the fuzzy 
addition of   and   is given in (1) and inverse of a fuzzy 
number   represented as   is shown in (2) below. 
             (1)     
                           (2) 
Unlike addition and subtraction, product of two trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers may not result into a trapezoidal number  
[6, 7]. Therefore, this paper uses an approximation of the 
product  of  two  trapezoidal  fuzzy  numbers  to  a  new 
trapezoidal  fuzzy  number  [7].  The  product  of  two 
trapezoidal  fuzzy  numbers,  A  and  B  given  above  is 
approximated  by  the  trapezoidal  fuzzy  number   
 as proposed in [6, 7] where, 
         
                ,    
        , 
         , 
         
                                             (3) 
For  defuzzifying,  Centre  Of  Area  (COA)  or  Centroid 
method is used. For a fuzzy number  , its 
COA is computed as: .  
The proposed reputation computation methodology based 
on  the  concept  of  reinforcement  learning  and  fuzzy  set 
theory  is  divided  into  three  phases.  In  Phase  I,  a b uyer 
expresses  its  willingness  to  buy  a  good  and  the  set  of 
sellers’ who respond for selling that good are elicited and a 
seller  selection  methodology  using  fuzzy  arithmetic  is 
applied to select a seller for purchasing that good. Phase II 
includes  reputation  computation  using  reinforcement 
learning.  It  begins  after  purchasing  the  good,  where  the 
buyer  updates  the  sellers’  reputation  based  on  the 
experience of the current transaction and the opinion from 
others. Finally in Phase III, the buyer updates its list of 
reputed,  non-reputed,  dis-reputed  and  new  sellers.  A 
detailed  description  of  this  methodology  divided  into 
Phase I, Phase II and Phase III is given below. 
Phase I:  
1.  The process of buying and selling starts with a buyer b 
announcing  the  need   t o  buy  a  good  g  by  sending 
broadcast request to all sellers. Those sellers who are 
willing to sell good g respond by submitting their bids. 
At  any  given  time,  buyer  b  preferably  purchases  a 
good  from  a r eputed  seller.   I f  no  seller  from  the 
reputed list offers good g then the buyer b selects a 
seller from the set of non-reputed sellers but in no case 
the buyer would choose a dis-reputed seller [27]. In 
addition,  with  a  small  probability  ρ,  buyer  b  would 
choose a seller from the list of new sellers’ i.e.  . 
Initially the value of ρ is 1 and it decreases over time 
to some minimum value defined by buyer b. 
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2.  After receiving sellers’ bids for good g, buyer b first 
computes the expected value   of good g’s offer 
from  each  seller  and  then  selects  a s eller  s  that  is 
offering good g with highest expected value i.e. max. 
 based on the following strategy by computing 
goods’ attribute weights using extent analysis method 
[5, 28]  and combining it with fuzzy AHP technique.  
 
i.  Obtain  the  buyers’  assessment  of  pairwise 
comparison  of  different  attributes  of  a  good  in 
linguistic  terms  like  Equally  important  (E), 
Moderately  Important (M), Highly Important (H), 
Very  Highly  Important  (VH)  or  Extremely 
Important (EI) as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
   
 
 
Fig. 1  Fuzzy Scale for Relative Importance of  Attributes 
 
Using  fuzzy  scale  of  Fig.  1,  map  these  linguistic 
terms  to  trapezoidal  fuzzy  values.  For  example, 
Highly  Important  (H)  is  mapped  to  trapezoidal 
fuzzy number  (3,5,5,7). 
 
ii. Compute  subjective  fuzzy  weights  of  different 
attributes of good g from the buyer’s perspective by 
combining  extent  analysis  method  [5]  with  fuzzy 
AHP. Let   (Fuzzy Pairwise Matrix) represents 
the fuzzy reciprocal n x n matrix representing all 
pairwise comparisons   for all   as 
illustrated in Eq (4) below.  
 
   (4)                     
 
Where   and all   and their inverse   
are  trapezoidal  fuzzy  numbers.  The  subjective 
weight computation of attribute   denoted as   
is given in Eq. (5).  
 
        (5)                        
 
Further, compute   for i = 1,2 ..., n, i.e. for all 
attributes of a good represented by   is shown in 
Eq. (6).  
 
                            (6)  
                                                    
iii. Compute the empirical weight component  , i.e. 
the average of fuzzy weight of each attribute, for i = 
1, 2,..., n, in a maximum of k number of previous 
transactions by the same buyer for the same good 
represented by   below. 
 
                                (7)                                                         
 
iv. Obtain  the  overall  fuzzy  attribute  weight   of  a 
good by using Eq. (8) given below. 
             (8) 
Similarly, compute   for i = 1,2,..,n, represented 
by   as shown in Eq. (9). 
 
                                  (9) 
 
In Eq. (8), the value of δ is zero in the case of a 
buyer  purchasing  a  good  for  the  first  time.  With 
each  subsequent  purchase  of the same good by a 
buyer, the value of δ increases by a small fraction. 
This  ensures  that  initially  when  a  buyer  has  no 
experience of buying a good, the overall weight of a 
goods’ attributes depends only on subjective weight 
component of each attribute of the good i.e.,  . 
As  buyer  gains  experience  by  buying  a  good 
repeatedly, the importance of its empirical weight 
component i.e.    increases and the importance 
of subjective weight component i.e.   decreases 
proportionately. This means that after participating 
in sufficiently large number of transactions, say k 
=100 transactions for an δ increment rate of 0.01, 
by the same buyer for a particular good, it is not 
necessary  for  a  buyer  to  incur  the  overhead  of 
computing  the  subjective  weights  of  the  goods’ 
attributes  and  instead  utilise  the  previous 
transactions weight information.     
 
v. Solicit the buyers’ assessment of each seller’s offer 
for  the  good  in  linguistic  terms  like  Poor  (P), 
Average  (A),  High(H),  Very  High  (VH)  or 
Excellent (EX) based on trapezoidal fuzzy scale of 
Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2  Fuzzy Scale for Linguistic Performance of Sellers 
 
vi. Using  fuzzy  scale  of  Fig.  2,  map  these  linguistic 
terms  into  fuzzy  performance  ratings  of  good g’s 
offers by different sellers. Let   represents fuzzy 
performance ratings of seller i for attribute j. Fuzzy 
performance of each seller i, for i = 1,2..,m and for 
each  attribute  j,  for  j  =  1,2,..,n  is  represented  by 
fuzzy attribute performance matrix   in Eq. (10).  
 
         (10)                                   
 
As per Fig. 3, if seller 1’s goods’ performance for 
attribute  2  is  “VH”  then  its  fuzzy  performance 
rating as per Eq. (10) is  . 
 
vii. Compute  the  fuzzy  value  of  the  seller  i’s  good 
as:  .  The  fuzzy  value 
matrix of each seller i’s good, for i = 1, 2, ..., m 
represented by    is shown in Eq. (11) below. 
 
(11)     
               
viii. viii. Perform defuzzification on the fuzzy matrix   to 
obtain crisp value matrix CVS using Centre of Area 
approach (COA). CVS contains the crisp expected 
value  i.e.  of  good  g’s  offer  from  each 
seller. 
 
ix. Select the seller s with the highest crisp expected 
value i.e. max.   of the good g for placing 
purchase order for the good g.  
Phase II: 
3.  Once  the  buyer  receives  a  good  after  purchase,  it 
computes  the  actual  value  of  that  good  i.e.  , 
reflecting whether the received good is satisfactory or 
not as per the buyers’ assessment of the actual good by 
again using step 2 of Phase I.  
4.  After  computing  the  actual  value  of  a  good,  buyer 
updates  the  individual  reputation  of  seller  by  first 
computing the difference between the actual value and 
the  expected  value  of  the  good  as  given  in  Eq. (12) 
below. 
Δ =                       (12) 
5.  If   Δ > 0, then using reinforcement learning technique, 
buyer b updates reputation of the seller s at time t+1 i.e. 
  with a value greater than its current value as 
shown in Eq. (13) below. 
          (13)                                                                                              
Where μ represents effective reputation value increase 
factor as shown in Eq. (14).  
                                                 (14) 
and,                                       (15)                                                  
Eq. (15) is used to map the value of a transaction x in 
the range from 0 to 1 which in case of a single good 
being purchased is equal to the price p of the good g. 
Also  λ  is  a  constant  in  the  range  0  to  1,  and  e is a 
constant with a value of 1.01. The function to compute 
η in Eq. (15) ensures that the value of μ in Eq. (14) and 
hence  the  reputation   increases  monotonically 
with  the  value  of  transaction.  In  Eq.  (14),  β  is  a 
constant with initial value 0 and its value increases by a 
small  factor,  say  0.001,  with  each  successive 
transaction  between  the  same  buyer  seller  pair.  This 
ensures  that  with  increase  in  mutual  experience  of  a 
buyer-seller pair, reputation value i.e.   increases 
at  a r elatively  smaller  rate  for  the  same  value 
transaction according to the convention that reputation 
earned from different buyers is more important than the 
reputation  earned  from  large  number  of  repeated 
transactions with the same buyer as shown in Table 1 
below.  
Table 1: Monotonic Increase of Reputation with value of transaction 
but discounted with increase in number of transactions between the 
same buyer-seller pair (For  previous reputation i.e.   = 0.37) 
Value of 
Transaction   
(x) 
For  β = 0  For β = 0.5 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase 
 in 
Reputation 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase  
 in 
 Reputation 
100  0.001  0.371  0.169  0.0007  0.37  0.113 
500  0.005  0.373   0.845  0.003  0.372  0.563 
2000  0.02  0.3824   3.355  0.013  0.378  2.237 
5000  0.049  0.401  8.264  0.032  0.39  5.509 
10000  0.095 0.4297  16.127  0.063  0.4098  10.751 
20000  0.18  0.4837  30.726  0.12  0.446  20.484 
It can also be observed from Eq. (13) that individual 
reputation at time t+1 is based on overall reputation at 
time  t  to  impress  upon  the  fact  that  in  the  next 
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by a buyer at the end of previous transaction becomes 
the  individual  experience  of  that  buyer  agent.  On 
comparing  the  relative  increase  in  percentage  of 
reputation  in  case  of  a b uyer-seller  pair  having  no 
previous  transaction  represented  by  β  =  0  and  after 
gaining experience of 500 transactions represented by β 
= 0.5, it is found that relative increase in reputation is 
less in case of  β = 0.5 as compared to the situation 
where β = 0 as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3  Monotonic increase of reputation with value of  transaction 
but this increase is discounted/reduced with increase in number of 
transactions between the same buyer-seller pair to minimise the 
effect of collusion between a particular buyer and seller 
6.  If Δ < 0, which represents the fact that the purchased 
good  g  has  not  been  satisfactory  as  per  buyer  b’s 
assessment, then using reinforcement learning, buyer b 
updates the  reputation of the seller s at time t+1 i.e. 
 by  a v alue  less  than  its  current  value  as 
described by Eq. (16). 
         (16)                                                
Where ξ represents effective reputation value decrease 
factor due to unsatisfactory or dishonest behaviour of a 
seller agent and is illustrated in Eq. (17) below.  
                                               (17) 
Where γ is the Penalty Factor and value of γ is kept 
greater than 1 to ensure that reputation decreases at a 
faster pace as compared to the rate of its increase. This 
property is based on the convention that reputation is 
difficult to build but easy to tear down. The underlying 
purpose  is to discourage dishonest behavior of seller 
agents  in  e-market  by  slapping  a  higher  penalty  on 
fraudulent sellers. Like μ,  ξ is also dependent on the 
value  of  a t ransaction  and  the  number  of  past 
transactions  between  a  particular  buyer-seller  pair. 
Hence there is steep reputation drop for a large value 
transaction as compared to a small value transaction as 
described in Table 2.  
Table  2:  Monotonic  Decrease  of  Reputation  with  value  of  a 
transaction but discounted  with increase in number of transactions 
between the same buyer-seller (Previous reputation,   = 0.37) 
Value of 
Transaction   
(x) 
For  β = 0, γ = 2  For β = 0.5,  γ = 2 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase 
in 
Reputation 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase 
in 
Reputation 
100  0.002 0.3687  -0.339  0.0013 0.3692  -0.226 
500  0.01  0.3637  -1.69  0.006  0.3658  -1.127 
2000  0.039 0.3452  -6.71  0.026  0.3534  -4.473 
5000  0.097 0.3088  -16.53  0.064  0.3292  -11.02 
10000  0.189 0.2507  -32.25  0.126  0.2904  -21.5 
20000  0.361 0.1426  -61.45  0.24  0.2184  -40.97 
The  use  of  the  penalty  factor  γ  =  2   applied  during 
reputation  computation  ensures  that  the  reputation 
drops  at  twice  the  rate  as  compared  to  the 
corresponding rate of its increase for the same value 
transaction.  Comparison  of  relative  increase  and 
decrease in reputation corresponding to the changes in 
the  value  of  transaction  and  number  of  transactions 
between a particular buyer-seller pair is shown in Fig. 4 
below.  
 
 
Fig. 4   Reputation drops faster than its increase                                     
to discourage  dishonest sellers 
7.  After computing the individual reputation of a seller, 
this model combines it with the shared reputation about 
the seller s from other buyers to compute the overall 
reputation  of  the  seller  agent  s.  The  equation  to 
compute overall reputation function    is given 
below in Eq. (18).  
 
  (18)                                                                                                                                                 
Where   is  the  individual  reputation  of  seller  s 
that is computed by the buyer b itself and   is 
the aggregate of the reputation rating of seller s that is 
received  from  other  buyer  agents.  Further,  α  is  the 
experience gain factor and  . The initial value 
of α before the first transaction between a buyer-seller 
pair  is  0  and  with  each  successive  transaction,  it  is 
incremented by a small factor of  say 0.01 to ensure 
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seller  pair,  relative  weight  of  Individual  Reputation 
(IR)  component  i.e.     increases  and  that  of 
Shared  Reputation  (SR)  component  i.e.   
decreases. This implements the dynamic property that 
with  increasing  mutual  transactional  experience,  a 
particular buyer-seller pair would depend more on their 
past mutual experience and less on the opinion from 
other agents. The actual rate at which the value of α 
should increase depends on the good to be purchased 
and  is  to  be  decided  by  domain  experts.  After 
sufficiently large number of transactions, as value of α 
approaches 1,   would depend only on   
and  the  weightage  of   would  effectively 
become zero. This ensures that initially when a buyer 
agent has no experience of a seller, its dependence is 
greater  on  the  opinion  from  other  buyers  although  it 
means incurring some communication overhead. Once 
a buyer gains sufficient experience of past transactions 
with a particular buyer, it can avoid the overhead of 
inter-agent  communication  as  the  computation  of 
overall  reputation  depends  only  on  the  individual 
reputation component. Hence, this framework employs 
judicious use of information sharing and thus reduces 
its cost with effective inter-agent communication.    
If a seller is new to a buyer b i.e.    then, 
                          (19)                                              
And,  if  a  seller  is  new  in  the  marketplace,  i.e. 
  then, 
                                     (20)                                                               
Phase III: 
8.  Finally, on the basis of the overall reputation rating of a 
seller s, sets of reputed, non-reputed, dis-reputed and 
new sellers i.e. SR, SNR, SDR and SNewR are updated as: 
If s is not a reputed seller, and  , then 
   .                               (21)    
If s is a reputed seller, and   , then 
   .                               (22)                                    
If s is not a dis-reputed seller, and  , then 
   .                               (23) 
If s is not  non-reputed, and   ,  
  .                              (24)               
 Finally, if s is a new seller, and, if  , then 
   .                        (25)   
To summarize, the main functions of dynamic reputation 
framework are illustrated using flowcharts in Fig. 5   and 
Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 5  Dynamic Reputation Framework for Reputation System 
The  flowchart  summarizing  the  algorithm  of  seller 
selection  strategy  for  computing  expected/actual  value  a 
product is given in  Fig. 6 ahead. 
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Fig. 6  Seller Selection Strategy (SSS) for computing                     
expected / actual value of a good 
4. Common Attacks and Proposed Defense 
Reputation systems are different from general trust based 
systems in a way that they include self interested actors or 
agents who cheat and effectively launch various attacks to 
defeat  these  systems.  The  impact  of  attacks  against 
reputation systems is much more than the manipulation of 
reputation values as these result into money fraudulently 
lost and ruined business reputations. This section discusses 
different type of  attacks classified in literature [2, 3, 18, 
22, 24] and presents a comparative performance analysis 
of the defense capability of the proposed system against 
these attacks. 
In Ballot Stuffing (BS), a group of agents collude to rate a 
particular agent with abnormally high ratings, whereas in 
Badmouthing (BM) an agent is rated abnormally low. In 
this attack, colluding agents participate in events that lead 
to allocation of reputation or feedback about that agent.  
Re-ENtry (REN) is an attack where a low rated agent exits 
the market and re-enters with a new identity. This attack is 
facilitated by the availability of cheap pseudonyms in the 
online environment. The reputation systems with negative 
feedback are especially vulnerable to REN. 
An  attack  in  which  two  agents  mutually  rate each other 
with abnormally high ratings is called RECiprocity (REC) 
whereas in RETaliation (RET) both the agents rate each 
other with abnormally low ratings. 
Reputation-Lag (RL) takes advantage of the lag i.e. time 
gap, before cheating results in reduced reputation. During 
this period, an agent gets unlimited opportunities to cheat 
before other agents become aware of its loss of reputation 
due to malicious behaviour. 
In  Value-IMbalance  (VIM)  attack,  reputation  earned  or 
lost  during  a  transaction  is  not  related  to  value  of  a 
transaction.  The  effect  of  showing  honest  behaviour  by 
selling a large number of high quality but low value goods 
and, dishonest behaviour by selling a small number of low 
quality  but  high  value  goods  does  not  result  into  any 
significant loss in reputation score. This helps a malicious 
seller who behaves honestly for small transactions to gain 
reputation and then cheats in large transactions. 
If a seller agent has no further utility of good reputation, it 
utilises  its  entire  reputation  to  cheat  and  exits  from  e-
market. This attack is called Sudden-Exit (SE). 
In Multiple-Identity (MI) or Sybil Attack, a seller is able to 
open multiple accounts thereby increasing its probability to 
sell a good. It continues selling the goods honestly through 
some  and  dishonestly  through  others  without  facing  any 
significant penalty. It exits from the account with a low 
reputation and opens another account.  
Sometimes, a number of attackers employ a combination of 
strategies to launch a multifaceted and coordinated attack. 
This  is  known  as  Orchestrated  (ORC)  attack  [18]. 
Attackers  change  their  behaviour  overtime  and  divide 
themselves  into  sub-groups  where  each  group  plays  a 
different role at different time.  
4.1 Comparative Performance Analysis 
Reputation  systems  seek  to  generate  an  accurate 
assessment  of  participants’  behaviour  in  potentially 
adversarial environments [18]. In uncertain and un-trusted 
agent  based  environment  of  e-market,  where  the  actual 
buyers  and  sellers  may  never  meet,  absence  of  such 
systems may lead to rampant cheating, fraud, mistrust and 
eventual system failure. Hence, the success of a reputation 
system  is  measured  by  the  accuracy  of  computed 
reputation that predicts the quality of future interactions in 
an environment where a participant may try to exploit the 
system to its own advantage. This section highlights the 
performance of dynamic reputation framework based on its 
relative  strength  as  compared  to  other  models  from  the 
literature in Table 3. 
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based on known attacks/problems and defense mechanisms 
Type of 
Attack / 
Problem 
Defense Mechanisms in 
proposed Dynamic Reputation 
Framework 
Defense 
Mechanisms in  
Other Models 
Value 
Imbalance 
(VIM) 
VIM is resolved as the amount 
of change in reputation is 
monotonically related to the 
value of a transaction. 
No model except 
Truntis deals with 
this problem. 
Reputation 
Lag  (RL) 
RL is reduced as with increase 
in the mutual experience of a 
buyer-seller pair, weightage of 
shared reputation reduces and 
finally becomes negligible after 
large number of transactions. 
Models based only 
on individual repu-
tation [21, 24, 26] 
do not suffer from 
RL, other models  
have no solution.     
Reciprocity 
(REC) and 
Retaliation 
(RET) 
Its effect is minimised  as 
reputation earned by a seller in 
lieu of repeated transactions 
with the same buyer is 
discounted with each successive 
transaction. Effect of REC/RET 
is also limited by the value of 
transaction. 
Commercial 
models like eBay  
have a strong 
presence of this 
attack as 98% of 
the eBay ratings 
are positive due to 
the fear of RET. 
Re-entry 
(REN) 
REN attack is partially resolved 
as to re-enter, an agent must 
lose existing reputation and re-
start with minimum reputation. 
e-Bay and Truntis 
deal with this 
problem with 
partial success. 
Sudden Exit 
(SE) 
Probability of SE attack is 
reduced. As reputation earned is 
proportional to value of 
transaction, so to cheat and exit 
from e- market, an agent has to 
first earn sufficient reputation 
by being honest for both large 
value and large number of tran-
sactions. Losing hard earned 
reputation is not viable unless 
transaction value is very high. 
No feasible 
solution in any of 
the proposed 
model so far. 
Multiple-
Identity (MI)  No inbuilt feasible solution.  No feasible 
solution provided. 
Ballot 
Stuffing 
(BS)/ 
Bad-
mouthing 
(BM) 
The effect of BS/BM reduces 
with each successive transaction 
between a buyer-seller pair as 
weightage of shared reputation 
decreases and becomes 
negligible when an agent gains 
sufficient experience of other 
trader agent. 
Evidential model, 
TRAVOS, 
REGRET and 
Broker-Assisting 
TRS try to deal 
with this attack 
with varying 
success. 
Orchestrated 
(ORC) 
Only partial solution to a subset 
of attacks is possible as dealing 
multiple attacks with actors 
changing roles is very difficult. 
No known solution 
for this type of 
multifaceted 
attacks. 
Reputation  systems  foster  good  behaviour,  punish  bad 
behaviour  when  it  occurs,  and  reduces  the risk of being 
harmed  by  others’  bad  behaviour.  Strengths  and 
weaknesses of reputation systems are assessed qualitatively 
on the basis of their ability to convert the experience of 
buyer  and  seller  agents  into  a  reputation  metric  that 
correctly  reflect  the  behaviour  of  participants  and  their 
capability to withstand different   type of attacks launched 
by dishonest agents. Therefore, a good reputation system 
must  incorporate  some  inbuilt  defense  mechanisms  to 
ensure that honest participants are rewarded with economic 
gains and cheaters are penalised with economic loss. The 
proposed strategy incorporates inbuilt defense capability in 
the  reputation  computation  methodology  itself  by 
increasing its resilience against various attacks especially 
Value Imbalance and Ballot Stuffing. It also discourages 
fraudulent  behaviour  by  slapping  a  higher  penalty  on 
dishonest sellers than the corresponding reward for honest 
behaviour. 
5. Case Study 
To  illustrate  the  application  of  proposed  reputation 
framework, a case study was conducted by simulating an 
electronic marketplace with four users as buyers and six 
users as sellers, i.e. B = {bi     where i = 1...4} and S = {sj   
where j = 1…6}, where B is the set of buyers and S is the 
set  of  sellers  in  the  marketplace  for  good  g.  Some 
scenarios in the marketplace are shown below. 
Scenario 1: A situation was investigated where buyer b3 
wanted to buy a good g. The sellers s1 to s6 were known to 
buyer  b3,  although  only  three  sellers  were  in  its overall 
reputed  list  i.e.   =  {s j  where  j  =  3,4,5}.  Further, 
=0.45,  =0.15, e = 1.01,  α incremental rate of 0.01 
and β incremental rate of 0.001 per transaction. Based on 
buyer b3’s experience, existing overall reputation   
of each seller is depicted in Table 4. 
Table 4: Individual reputation ratings of different sellers to buyer b3 
sj  s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6 
  0.25  0.48  0.50  0.37  0.57  0.20 
The buyer b3 specified the pairwise importance of different 
attributes of good g i.e. of Price (P), Quality (Q), Delivery 
Period (DP) and Service Offered (SO) in linguistic terms. 
Their equivalent fuzzy values based on the fuzzy scale of 
Fig. 2 are shown as Fuzzy Pairwise Matrix (   ) in (26). 
 
The  average  of  the  weights  in  the  previous  transactions 
were  =  (0.0405,0.115,0.115,0.2435),  = 
(0.11,0.46,0.46,0.87),    =  (0.074,0.196,0.196,0.443) 
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and W of different attributes of the good g as computed in 
MATLAB with δ = 0.27 are illustrated in Fig. 5 below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5  Overall weight computation of attributes  of good g by buyer b 
 
Sellers s1, s3, s4, s6, responded to sell good g to buyer b1. 
Now, buyer b1 computed the expected value of the product 
being offered by the four sellers as explained below.  
After  taking  buyers’  assessment  of  each  seller’s  product 
offer  for  the  attributes  Price  (P),  Quality  (Q),  Delivery 
Period (DP) and Service Offered (SO) in linguistic terms, 
the equivalent fuzzy performance matrix   representing 
fuzzy performance of various sellers’ offer for good g is 
shown in (27). 
 
Using  (11),    was computed as,    and 
after defuzzifying the resultant crisp expected value (CVS) 
representing the expected value of good g for each seller  
,    as  computed  using  MATLAB  is 
illustrated in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6  Fuzzy (FVS) and Crisp (CVS) values of Sellers’ offers 
Based on Fig. 6, seller  with the highest expected value 
of  the  good  g  as  12.2319  is  selected  by  buyer  b3  for 
purchase.  Also, as buyer b3 had 79 previous transactions 
with the seller s5, therefore α = 0.79 and β = 0.079. The 
price of good g  by seller s5 was 1500, so x = 1500. After 
purchasing, and receiving the good g, buyer b3 computed 
the actual value of the good g by again using step 2, Phase 
I of Section 3 as    = 13.346. 
Using (12),     ∆ = 13.146-12.2319 = 0.9141 > 0.        (28)                            
As ∆ > 0, buyer b3 incremented the individual   reputation 
of seller s5  as shown below.  
      = 1 – (1.01) 
-0.001*1500 = 0.014815    (29)                          
and  μ =     = 0.01373                        (30) 
Using (13),  =0.57+0.01373*(1-0.57)=0.576.  (31)                      
The aggregated shared reputation value for seller s5 was 
0.56. Therefore, b3 computed overall rating of seller s5 by 
combining   with   using Eq. (18) as: 
   = 0.79*0.576+(1-0.79)*0.56 = 0.572.      (32)  
Scenario 2: Another situation was investigated where buyer 
b2  wanted  to  buy  good  g.  Sellers  s1  to  s4  and  s6  were 
known to buyer b2, whereas sellers s3 and s6 were in its 
overall  reputed  list,  i.e. 
  =  {s j     where  j  =  3,6}. 
Moreover,  =0.5,  =0.25,  γ  =  3,  e  =  1.01,  α 
incremental rate of 0.01 per transaction and β incremental 
rate of 0.001 per transaction. After previous transaction of 
buyer b2, overall reputation ratings   for each seller 
are given in Table 5.  
Table 5:  Reputation ratings of different sellers in buyer b2’s memory 
sj  s1  s2  s3  s4  s6 
   0.312  0.43  0.51  0.39  0.53 
Using step 2, Phase I of section 3, the expected value of 
the good g equivalent to 11.65 was computed to be the 
maximum for seller s3 so the buyer b2 chose seller s3 to 
buy good g. Also, buyer b2 had 45 previous transactions 
with the seller s3, therefore α = 0.45 and β = 0.045. As 
seller s3 offered the good g at a price of 6750, so x = 6750. 
After purchasing, by again using step 2 of Phase I, buyer 
b2 computed the actual value of good g, i.e.   as 
10.87.  
Using (12),    ∆  =  10.87 – 11.65 = - 0.78 < 0.           (33)                        
As ∆ < 0, buyer b2 decremented the individual reputation  
of seller s5 as shown below. 
      = 1 – (1.01) 
-0.001*6750 = 0.064959    (34)                       
 ξ =  γ    =  0.18649              (35)                                    
Using (16),  =0.51-0.18649(1-0.51))=0.4186.  (36)                         
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was 0.54. Therefore, b2 finally computed overall rating of 
seller  s3  by  combining  its  individual  rating  of  s3  with 
 using Eq. (18) as shown below in Eq. (37). 
  =0.45* 0.41862 + (1- 0.45)*0.54=0.4854   (37)  
Scenario  3:  In  another  case  involving  Ballot  Stuffing 
attack, buyer b4 needed a good g. The sellers s1 to s6 were 
known to buyer b3 where s1, s2 and s4 are in its reputed 
list. Further,  =0.4,  =0.18, e = 1.01, α incremental 
rate  of  0.01  and  β  incremental  rate  of  0.001  per 
transaction. A number of successive transactions between 
the  buyer  b4  and  seller  s2  were  observed  where  Ballot 
Stuffing attack was launched on buyer b4 after 20, 50, 75, 
95 and 100 transactions between buyer b4 and seller s2. It 
was seen that the increase in reputation due to BS reduced 
with the increase in number of transactions as shown in 
Table 6.  
Table 6: Effect of BS reduces with increase in number of        
transactions between buyer b4 and seller s2 
 
Number 
of Tran-
sactions 
Value 
of Tran-
saction 
     
Effect of 
BS in %  
Change of  
Reputation 
0.47  20  12000  0.528  0.94  0.858  62.29 
0.44  50  1500  0.448  0.93  0.689  53.83 
0.48  75  5300  0.505  0.95  0.616  22.01 
0.51  95  3000  0.523  0.94  0.565  3.98 
0.46  100  2700  0.473  0.95  0.473  0 
 
It was also observed that the effect of Badmouthing would 
also  be  reduced  due  to  reduced  weightage  of  shared 
reputation with the increase in transactional experience of 
a buyer-seller pair. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper proposed a framework for a dynamic reputation 
system that is sensitive to the changing parameters of e-
market  environment  like  experience  of  agents  and  the 
value  of  a  transaction  in  e-market  environment.  The 
proposed system has improved inbuilt defense mechanisms 
against  various  attacks  especially  against  Ballot  Stuffing 
and  Value  Imbalance.  In  this  framework,  increase  in 
transactional  experience  leads  to  increased  weightage  of 
individual  reputation  and  honesty  in  a  large  transaction 
leads to a greater increase in reputation as compared to a 
small  transaction.  Further,  non-satisfactory  or  fraudulent 
sellers  are  penalized  with  relatively  large  drop  of 
reputation  resulting  into  reduced  future  business 
opportunities.  The  proposed  framework  makes  judicious 
use of information sharing by adapting to the changing e-
market environment. 
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